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Abstract
Motivated by the pursuit of a system-
atic computational and algorithmic under-
standing of Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs), we present a simple yet unified
non-asymptotic local convergence theory for
smooth two-player games, which subsumes
several discrete-time gradient-based saddle
point dynamics. The analysis reveals the sur-
prising nature of the off-diagonal interaction
term as both a blessing and a curse. On
the one hand, this interaction term explains
the origin of the slow-down effect in the con-
vergence of Simultaneous Gradient Ascent
(SGA) to stable Nash equilibria. On the
other hand, for the unstable equilibria, ex-
ponential convergence can be proved thanks
to the interaction term, for four modified
dynamics proposed to stabilize GAN train-
ing: Optimistic Mirror Descent (OMD), Con-
sensus Optimization (CO), Implicit Updates
(IU) and Predictive Method (PM). The anal-
ysis uncovers the intimate connections among
these stabilizing techniques, and provides de-
tailed characterization on the choice of learn-
ing rate. As a by-product, we present a new
analysis for OMD proposed in Daskalakis,
Ilyas, Syrgkanis, and Zeng [2017] with im-
proved rates.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the non-asymptotic local
convergence and stability of discrete-time gradient-
based optimization algorithms for solving smooth two-
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player zero-sum games of the form,
min
θPRp maxωPRq Upθ, ωq . (1)
The motivation behind our non-asymptotic analysis
follows from the observation that Generative Adver-
sarial Networks (GANs) lack principled understanding
at both the computational and algorithmic level. GAN
optimization is a special case of (1), which has been de-
veloped for learning a complex and multi-modal prob-
ability distribution based on samples from Preal (over
X ), through learning a generator function gθp¨q that
transforms the input distribution Pinput (over Z) to
match the target Preal. Ignoring the parameter regu-
larization, the value function corresponding to a GAN
is of the form,
Upθ, ωq “ Eh1pfωpXqq ´ Eh2pfωpgθpZqqq , (2)
where X „ Preal, Z „ Pinput and pθ, ωq P Rp ˆ Rq
parametrizes the generator function gθ : Z Ñ X
and discriminator function fω : X Ñ R, respec-
tively. The original GAN [Goodfellow et al., 2014],
for example, corresponds to choosing h1ptq “ log σptq,
h2ptq “ ´ logp1 ´ σptqq where σ is the sigmoid func-
tion; Wasserstein GAN [Arjovsky et al., 2017] consid-
ers h1ptq “ h2ptq “ t; f -GAN [Nowozin et al., 2016]
proposes to use h1ptq “ t, h2ptq “ f˚ptq, where f˚
denotes the Fenchel dual of f . Recently, several at-
tempts have been made to understand whether GANs
learn the target distribution in the statistical sense
[Liu et al., 2017, Arora and Zhang, 2017, Liang, 2017,
2018, Arora et al., 2017, Liu and Chaudhuri, 2018].
Optimization of GANs (and value functions of the
form (1) at large) is hard, both in theory and in prac-
tice [Singh et al., 2000, Pfau and Vinyals, 2016, Sal-
imans et al., 2016]. Global optimization of a general
value function with multiple saddle points is imprac-
tical and unstable, so we instead resort to the more
modest problem of searching for a local saddle point
pθ˚, ω˚q such that no player has the incentive to devi-
ate locally
Upθ˚, ω˚q ď Upθ, ω˚q , for θ in an open nbhd of θ˚ ,
Upθ˚, ω˚q ě Upθ˚, ωq , for ω in an open nbhd of ω˚ .
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For smooth value functions, the above conditions are
equivalent to the following solution concept:
Definition 1.1 (Local Nash Equilibrium). pθ˚, ω˚q is
called a local Nash equilibrium if
1. ∇θUpθ˚, ω˚q “ 0, ∇ωUpθ˚, ω˚q “ 0;
2. ∇θθUpθ˚, ω˚q ľ 0, ´∇ωωUpθ˚, ω˚q ľ 0.
Here we use ∇θωUpθ, ωq P Rpˆq to denote the off-
diagonal term B2U{BθBω, and name it the interaction
term throughout the paper. ∇θUpθ, ωq P Rp denotes
the gradient BU{Bθ, and ∇θθUpθ, ωq P Rpˆp for the
Hessian B2U{BθBθ.
In practice, discrete-time dynamical systems are em-
ployed to numerically approach the saddle points of
Upθ, ωq, as is the case in GANs [Goodfellow et al.,
2014], and in primal-dual methods for non-linear op-
timization [Singh et al., 2000]. The simplest possi-
bility is Simultaneous Gradient Ascent (SGA), which
corresponds to the following discrete-time dynamical
system,
θt`1 “ θt ´ η∇θUpθt, ωtq ,
ωt`1 “ ωt ` η∇ωUpθt, ωtq , (3)
where η is the step size or learning rate. In the limit of
vanishing step size, SGA approximates a continuous-
time autonomous dynamical system, the asymptotic
convergence of which has been established in Singh
et al. [2000], Cherukuri et al. [2017], Nagarajan and
Kolter [2017]. In practice, however, it has been widely
reported that the discrete-time SGA dynamics for
GAN optimization suffers from instabilities due to the
possibility of complex eigenvalues in the operator of
the dynamical system [Salimans et al., 2016, Metz
et al., 2016, Nagarajan and Kolter, 2017, Mescheder
et al., 2017, Heusel et al., 2017]. We believe room for
improvement still exists in the current theory, which
we hope will render it to be more informative in prac-
tice:
• Non-asymptotic convergence speed. In
practice, one is concerned with finite step size
η ą 0 which is typically subject to extensive hy-
perparameter tuning. Detailed characterizations
on the convergence speed, and theoretical insights
on the choice of learning rate can be helpful.
• Unified simple analysis for modified sad-
dle point dynamics. Several attempts to fix
GAN optimization have been put forth by inde-
pendent researchers, which modify the dynamics
[Mescheder et al., 2017, Daskalakis et al., 2017,
Yadav et al., 2017] using very different insights.
A unified analysis that reviews the deeper con-
nections amongst these proposals helps to better
understand the saddle point dynamics at large.
In this paper, we address the above points by studying
the theory of non-asymptotic convergence of SGA and
related discrete-time saddle point dynamics, namely,
Optimistic Mirror Descent (OMD), Consensus Opti-
mization (CO), Implicit Updates (IU) and Predictive
Method (PM). More concretely, we provide the follow-
ing theoretical contributions about the crucial effect of
the off-diagonal interaction term ∇θωUpθ, ωq in two-
player games:
• Stable case: curse of the interaction term.
Locally, SGA converges exponentially fast to a
stable Nash equilibrium with a carefully chosen
learning rate. This can be viewed as a gener-
alization (rather than a special case) of the lo-
cal convergence guarantee for single-player gra-
dient descent for strongly-convex functions. In
addition, we quantitatively isolate the slow-down
in the convergence rate of two-player SGA com-
pared to single-player gradient descent, due to
the presence of the off-diagonal interaction term
∇θωUpθ, ωq for the two-player game.
• Unstable case: blessing of the interaction
term. For unstable Nash equilibria, SGA di-
verges away for any non-zero learning rate. We
discover a unified non-asymptotic analysis that
encompasses four proposed modified dynamics —
OMD, CO, IU and PM. The analysis shows that
all these algorithms, at a high level, share the
same idea of utilizing the curvature introduced
by the interaction term ∇θωUpθ, ωq. Unlike the
slow sub-linear rate of convergence experienced
by single-player gradient descent for non-strongly
convex functions1, four modified dynamics effec-
tively exploit the interaction term to achieve expo-
nential convergence to unstable Nash equilibria.
The analysis also provides specific advice on the
choice of learning rate for each procedure, albeit
restricted to the simple case of bi-linear games.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we consider the situation when locally, the value
function satisfies strict convexity/concavity. We show
non-asymptotic exponential convergence to Nash equi-
libria for SGA, and identify an optimal learning rate.
1In fact, Nesterov [2013] constructed a convex function
that is non-strongly convex, such that all first order meth-
ods suffer slow sub-linear rate of convergence (in optimiza-
tion literature, linear rate refers to exponential convergence
speed).
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To reveal and understand the new features of the mod-
ified dynamics, we study in Section 3 the minimal un-
stable bilinear game, showing that proposed stabilizing
techniques all achieve exponential convergence to un-
stable Nash equilibria. Finally, in Section 4 we take a
step closer to the real world by numerically evaluating
each of the proposed dynamical systems using value
functions of GAN form (2), under objective evaluation
metrics. Proofs are deferred to the Appendix A.
2 Stable Case: Non-asymptotic Local
Convergence
In this section we will establish the non-asymptotic
convergence of SGA dynamics to saddle points that
are stable local Nash equilibria. With a properly cho-
sen learning rate, the local convergence can be in-
tuitively pictured as cycling inwards to these saddle
points, where the distance to the saddle point of inter-
est is exponentially contracting. First, let’s introduce
the notion of stable equilibrium.
Definition 2.1 (Stable Local Nash Equilibrium).
pθ˚, ω˚q is called a stable local Nash equilibrium if
1. ∇θUpθ˚, ω˚q “ 0, ∇ωUpθ˚, ω˚q “ 0;
2. ∇θθUpθ˚, ω˚q ą 0, ´∇ωωUpθ˚, ω˚q ą 0.
The above notion of stability is stronger than the
Definition 1.1, in the sense that ∇θθUpθ˚, ω˚q and
´∇ωωUpθ˚, ω˚q have smallest eigenvalues bounded
away from 0.
Assumption 2.1 (Local Strong Convexity-Concav-
ity). Consider Upθ, ωq : Rp ˆ Rq Ñ R that is smooth
and twice differentiable, and let pθ˚, ω˚q be a stable lo-
cal Nash equilibrium as in Definition 2.1. Assume that
for some r ą 0, there exists an open neighborhood near
pθ˚, ω˚q such that for all pθ, ωq P B2 ppθ˚, ω˚q, rq, the
following strong convexity-concavity condition holds,
∇θθUpθ, ωq ą 0, ´∇ωωUpθ, ωq ą 0 .
It will prove convenient to introduce some notation
before introducing the main theorem. Let us define
the following block-wise abbreviation for the matrix of
second derivatives,„ ∇θθUpθ, ωq ∇θωUpθ, ωq
´∇ωθUpθ, ωq ´∇ωωUpθ, ωq

:“
„
Aθ,ω Cθ,ω
´CTθ,ω Bθ,ω

,
(4)
and define α, β as
α :“ min
pθ,ωqPB2ppθ˚,ω˚q,rq
λmin
`
diagpA2θ,ω, B2θ,ωq
˘
,
β :“ max
pθ,ωqPB2ppθ˚,ω˚q,rq
λmax pFθ,ωq , (5)
Fθ,ω :“„
A2θ,ω ` Cθ,ωCTθ,ω ´Aθ,ωCθ,ω ` Cθ,ωBθ,ω
´CTθ,ωAθ,ω `Bθ,ωCTθ,ω B2θ,ω ` CTθ,ωCθ,ω

where λmaxpMq, λminpMq denote the largest and
smallest eigenvalue of matrix M .
Theorem 1 (Exponential Convergence: SGA). Con-
sider Upθ, ωq : Rp ˆ Rq Ñ R that satisfies Assump-
tion 2.1 for some radius r ą 0 near a stable local Nash
equilibrium pθ˚, ω˚q as in Definition 2.1. Suppose the
initialization satisfies pθ0, ω0q P B2ppθ˚, ω˚q, rq. Then
the SGA dynamics (3) with fixed learning rate
η “ ?α{β ,
(α, β defined in Eqn. (5)) obtains an -minimizer such
that pθT , ωT q P B2ppθ˚, ω˚q, q, as long as
T ě TSGA :“
R
2
β
α
log
r

V
.
Remark 1. It is interesting to compare the conver-
gence speed of the saddle point dynamics to conven-
tional gradient descent in one variable, for a strongly-
convex function. We remind the reader that to ob-
tain an -minimizer for a strongly-convex function, one
needs the following number of iterations of gradient
descent,
TGD :“ max
"
λmax pAθ,ωq
λmin pAθ,ωq log
r

,
λmax pBθ,ωq
λmin pBθ,ωq log
r

*
,
depending on whether we are optimizing with respect
to θ or ω, respectively. It is now evident that due to the
presence of Cθ,ωC
T
θ,ω, the convergence of two-player
SGA to a saddle-point can be significantly slower than
convergence of single-player gradient descent. In par-
ticular, applying the eigenvalue interlacing theorem to
the principal submatrix A2θ,ω ` Cθ,ωCTθ,ω of Fθ,ω we
obtain
λmax pFθ,ωq ě λmax
`
A2θ,ω ` Cθ,ωCTθ,ω
˘
,
ě λmax
`
A2θ,ω
˘
.
Therefore the convergence of SGA is slower than that
in the conventional GD2
TSGA ě TGD .
We would like to emphasize that for the saddle point
convergence, the slow-down effect of the interaction
term Cθ,ω is explicit in our non-asymptotic analysis.
2Recall that
λmaxpA2θ,ωq
λminpA2θ,ωq
ě λmaxpAθ,ωq
λminpAθ,ωq .
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The intuition that the discrete-time SGA dynamics
cycles inward to a stable Nash equilibrium exponen-
tially fast can be seen in the following way. The pres-
ence of the off-diagonal anti-symmetric component in
Eqn. (4) means that the associated linear operator
of the discrete-time dynamics has complex eigenval-
ues, which results in periodic cycling behavior. How-
ever, due to the explicit choice of η, the distance
to stable Nash equilibrium is shrinking exponentially
fast. The local exponential stability in the infinites-
imal/asymptotic case when η Ñ 0 has already been
studied in a paper Nagarajan and Kolter [2017] (The-
orem 3.1 therein) by showing the Jacobian matrix of
a particular form of GAN objective is Hurwitz (has
all strictly negative eigenvalues). There are two dis-
tinct differences in our result: (1) we provide non-
asymptotic convergence, with specific guidance on the
choice of learning rate η; (2) our analysis goes through
analyzing the singular values (which is rather differ-
ent from the modulus of eigenvalue for a general ma-
trix), instead of involving the complex eigenvalues, and
this simple technique generalizes to four other modi-
fied saddle point dynamics which we discuss in the
next section.
In fact, one can show that the slow-down effect of the
interaction term Cθ,ω for SGA in the above theorem
is indeed necessary.
Corollary 1 (Simple Lower Bound for SGA). Con-
sider Upθ, ωq “ 12θT θ´ 12ωTω ` θTCω with p “ q and
C P Rpˆq full rank. Then the SGA dynamics (3) with
any fixed learning rate η satisfies
}θt`1}2 ` }ωt`1}2 ě λminpC
TCq
1` λminpCTCq
`}pθt}2 ` }ωt}2˘ .
The above corollary shows that for any stepsize η, to
obtain -solution, the number of SGA iteration is at
least Ωpp1` λminpCTCqq logp1{qq. Namely, the inter-
action term is indeed a curse to the convergence rate.
3 Unstable Case: Local Bi-Linear
Problem
Oscillation and instability for SGA occurs when the
problem is non-strongly convex-concave, as in the bi-
linear game (or more precisely, at least linear in one
player). This observation was first pointed out using a
very simple linear game Upx, yq “ xy in Salimans et al.
[2016]. More generally, as a result of Theorem 1, this
phenomenon occurs when the local Nash equilibrium
is non-stable,
diagpAθ˚,ω˚ , Bθ˚,ω˚q « 0 ðñ„
Aθ˚,ω˚ Cθ˚,ω˚
´CTθ˚,ω˚ Bθ˚,ω˚

«
„
0 Cθ˚,ω˚
´CTθ˚,ω˚ 0

.
Let’s consider an extreme case when Aθ˚,ω˚ “ 0 and
Bθ˚,ω˚ “ 0. In this case, we will use a novel uni-
fied non-asymptotic analysis to show that the follow-
ing proposed dynamics can fix the oscillation problem
and provide exponential convergence to unstable Nash
equilibria:
(1) Optimistic Mirror Descent (OMD) in Daskalakis
et al. [2017]
(2) A modified version of Predictive Methods (PM)
motivated from Yadav et al. [2017]
(3) Implicit Updates
(4) Consensus Optimization (CO) introduced in
Mescheder et al. [2017]
Our analysis shows that these stabilizing techniques,
at a high level, all manipulate the dynamics to uti-
lize the curvature generated by the interaction term
Cθ˚,ω˚C
T
θ˚,ω˚ — which we refer to as the “blessing” of
the interaction term, to contrast with the “slow-down
effect” of the interaction term in the strongly convex-
concave case (Theorem 1). Once again, as alluded to
in the introduction, this fast linear-rate convergence
result in the non-strongly convex-concave two-player
game should be contrasted with the significantly slower
sub-linear convergence rate for all first-order-methods
in convex but non-strongly convex single-player opti-
mization. The latter was proved by a lower bound ar-
gument in [Nesterov, 2013, Theorem 2.1.7]. The main
result proved in this section is informally stated
Theorem 2 (Informal: Unstable Case). All these four
modified dynamics, in the bi-linear game, enjoy the
last iterate exponential convergence guarantee.
The bilinear game can be motivated by considering
the Taylor expansion of a general smooth two-player
game around a non-stable Nash equilibrium (A,B «
0), assuming that pθ˚, ω˚q “ p0,0q. Now consider the
simple bi-linear game Upθ, ωq “ θTCω. With the SGA
dynamics defined in (3), one can easily verify that
}θt`1}2 ě
`
1` η2λminpCCT q
˘ }θt}2 ,
}ωt`1}2 ě
`
1` η2λminpCTCq
˘ }ωt}2 .
Therefore, the continuous limit η Ñ 0 is cycling
around a sphere, while with any practical learning rate
η ‰ 0, the distance to the Nash equilibrium can be in-
creasing exponentially instead of converging. Per The-
orem 1 and the discussion above, instability for SGA
only occurs when the local game is approximately bi-
linear. From now on, therefore, we will focus on the
simplest unstable form of the game, the bi-linear game,
to isolate the main idea behind fixing the instability
problem. The proof technique can be extended to more
general settings, with a sacrifice of simplicity.
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3.1 (Improved) Optimistic Mirror Descent
Daskalakis, Ilyas, Syrgkanis, and Zeng [2017] employed
Optimistic Mirror Descent (OMD) [Rakhlin and Srid-
haran, 2013] motivated by online learning to solve
the instability problem in GANs. Here we provide a
stronger result, showing that the last iterate of OMD
enjoys exponential convergence for bi-linear games.
We note that although the last-iterate convergence of
this OMD procedure was already rigorously proved in
Daskalakis et al. [2017], the exponential convergence
is not known to the best of our knowledge.
Theorem 3 (Exponential Convergence: OMD). Con-
sider a bi-linear game Upθ, ωq “ θTCω. Assume p “ q
and C is full rank. Then the OMD dynamics,
θt`1 “ θt ´ 2η∇θUpθt, ωtq ` η∇θUpθt´1, ωt´1q ,
ωt`1 “ ωt ` 2η∇ωUpθt, ωtq ´ η∇ωUpθt´1, ωt´1q ,
(6)
with the learning rate
η “ 1
2
a
2λmaxpCCT q
,
obtains an -minimizer such that pθT , ωT q P B2pq,
provided
T ě TOMD :“
R
16
λmaxpCCT q
λminpCCT q log
4
?
2r

V
,
under the assumption that }pθ0, ω0q}, }pθ1, ω1q} ď r.
Let us compare our result with the last-iterate con-
vergence result in Daskalakis et al. [2017]. Roughly
speaking, [Daskalakis et al., 2017, Theorem 1] asserts
that to obtain an -minimizer, one requires a learning
rate scaling as ηpq — 2 and a number of iterations
bounded by
T Á ´4 log
1

¨ Poly
ˆ
λmaxpCCT q
λminpCCT q
˙
.
In contrast, we show that with step size η chosen in-
dependently of , the last iterate of OMD falls within
 of the saddle point after a number of iterations given
by
T Á log
1

¨ λmaxpCC
T q
λminpCCT q .
In other words, we improved the dependence on  from
polynomial to logarithmic. This improved analysis
also coincides with the exponential convergence found
in simulations.
3.2 (Modified) Predictive Methods
From a very different motivation in ordinary differen-
tial equations, Yadav et al. [2017] proposed Predictive
Methods (PM) to fix the instability problem. The in-
tuition is to evaluate the gradient at a predictive future
location and then perform the update. In this section,
we propose and analyze a modified version of the pre-
dictive method (for simultaneous gradient updates),
inspired by Yadav et al. [2017].
Consider the following modified PM dynamics,
predictive step: θt`1{2 “ θt ´ γ∇θUpθt, ωtq ,
ωt`1{2 “ ωt ` γ∇ωUpθt, ωtq ;
gradient step: θt`1 “ θt ´ η∇θUpθt`1{2, ωt`1{2q ,
ωt`1 “ ωt ` η∇ωUpθt`1{2, ωt`1{2q .
(7)
Theorem 4 (Exponential Convergence: PM). Con-
sider a bi-linear game Upθ, ωq “ θTCω. Assume p “ q
and C is full rank. Fix some γ ą 0. Then the PM
dynamics in Eqn. (7) with learning rate
η “ γλminpCC
T q
λmaxpCCT q ` γ2λ2maxpCCT q ,
obtains an -minimizer such that pθT , ωT q P B2pq,
provided
T ě TPM :“
R
2
γ2λ2maxpCCT q ` λmaxpCCT q
γ2λ2minpCCT q
log
r

V
,
under the assumption that }pθ0, ω0q} ď r.
3.3 Implicit Updates
Implicit Update (IU) rules have been shown to be
more robust compared to explicit updates, and typ-
ically match the performance or even outperform
the latter empirically in online learning [Kulis and
Bartlett, 2010]. We will show that a simple adap-
tation of implicit updates for simultaneous gradient
ascent/descent resolves the instability problem in the
bi-linear case.
Theorem 5 (Exponential Convergence: IU). Con-
sider a bi-linear game Upθ, ωq “ θTCω. Assume p “ q
and C is full rank. Then the implicit updates
θt`1 “ θt ´ η∇θUpθt`1, ωt`1q ,
ωt`1 “ ωt ` η∇ωUpθt`1, ωt`1q ,
with the learning rate
η “ 1a
λmaxpCCT q
obtains an -minimizer such that pθT , ωT q P B2pq,
provided
T ě TIU :“
R
p2`?2qλmaxpCC
T q
λminpCCT q log
r

V
under the assumption that }pθ0, ω0q} ď r.
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3.4 Consensus Optimization
Consensus Optimization (CO) is another elegant at-
tempt to fix the aforementioned problem, proposed in
Mescheder et al. [2017]. The idea is to add a potential
component to the pure-curl vector field associated with
SGA in the bi-linear game, in order to attract the dy-
namics to the critical points. [Mescheder et al., 2017,
Nagarajan and Kolter, 2017] analyzed the infinitesi-
mal flow version of the consensus optimization, and
intuitively showed that it pushes the real part of the
eigenvalue away from 1, to ensure asymptotic conver-
gence. In this section, we provide a simple convergence
analysis of the discretized dynamics, of the same flavor
as the previous section. An upshot of the analysis is
that it sheds light on possible choices of learning rate.
Recall that the regularization term defining consensus
optimization is given by,
Rpθ, ωq “ 1
2
`}∇θUpθ, ωq}2 ` }∇ωUpθ, ωq}2˘ . (8)
Surprisingly, we find that the consensus optimization
coincides with the modified predictive method for the
bi-linear game, as described by the following
Theorem 6 (Exponential Convergence: CO). Con-
sider a bi-linear game Upθ, ωq “ θTCω. Assume p “ q
and C is full rank. Recall Rpθ, ωq defined in Eqn. (8),
and fix some γ ą 0. Then the CO dynamics with the
same learning rate η as in Thm. 4,
θt`1 “ θt ´ η r∇θUpθt, ωtq ` γ∇θRpθt, ωtqs ,
ωt`1 “ ωt ` η r∇ωUpθt, ωtq ´ γ∇ωRpθt, ωtqs , (9)
converges exponentially fast in the same way as the
PM dynamics in Thm. 4.
4 Experiments
In the simplistic setting of bilinear games we have seen
that exponential convergence can be achieved for ap-
propriate choice of learning rate and this is indeed con-
firmed by numerical experiments as shown in Fig. 1.
In reality, however, the assumption of bilinearity is
not applicable to value functions of GAN form and in-
deed recent large-scale studies of GAN optimization
[Lucic et al., 2017] suggest that improvements from
algorithmic changes mostly disappeared after taking
into account hyper-parameter tuning and randomness
of initialization. They conclude that “future GAN re-
search should be based on more systematic and objec-
tive evaluation procedures.” Inspired by this conclu-
sion, we conduct a systematic evaluation of the pro-
posed optimization algorithms on two basic density
learning problems, and introduce corresponding ob-
jective evaluation metrics. The goal of this analysis
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
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Figure 1: Distance to Nash equilibrium as a function
of gradient iteration for the bilinear game assuming
p “ q “ 5, γ “ 1 and r “ 0.5. The components of
the interaction matrix C were chosen i.i.d. uniform on
r0, 1s.
is not to achieve state-of-art performance, but rather
to compare and contrast the existing proposals in a
carefully controlled learning environment. We focus
on the Wasserstein GAN formulation so that the value
function is given by
Upθ, ωq “ E
X„Preal
fωpXq ´ E
Z„Np0,Ikq
fωpgθpZqq ,
where fω : Rd Ñ R is a multi-layer neural net-
work with L hidden layers and rectifier non-linearities
and the input distribution Pinput was chosen to be k-
dimensional standard Gaussian noise. Following Gul-
rajani et al. [2017], we impose the Lipschitz-1 con-
straint on the discriminator network using the two-
sided gradient penalty term Λpωq introduced in [Gul-
rajani et al., 2017, Eqn. (3)]. The consensus optimiza-
tion loss is defined with respect to the value function
as in (8) without including gradient penalty. The com-
bined loss function of the discriminator and generator
are respectively,
Ldispθ, ωq “ ´Upθ, ωq ` γ Rpθ, ωq ` λΛpωq ,
Lgenpθ, ωq “ Upθ, ωq ` γ Rpθ, ωq .
The coefficients of the gradient penalty and consensus
optimization terms were determined by a coarse pa-
rameter search and then locked to λ “ γ “ 1 through-
out. In order to make close contact with our theoret-
ical formalism, we optimize the above loss functions
using simultaneous gradient updates with fixed learn-
ing rate of η “ 10´3.
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4.1 Learning Covariance of Multivariate
Gaussian
Consider the problem of learning the covariance ma-
trix Σ P Sd`` of a d-dimensional multivariate Gaus-
sian distribution Preal “ Np0,Σq with non-degenerate
covariance Σ ą 0. Note that the learning problem
is well-specified if we choose the generator function
gθ : Rk Ñ Rd to be a simple linear transformation of
the k-dimensional latent space (k ě d). Although the
GAN approach is clearly overkill for this simple den-
sity estimation problem, we find this example illumi-
nating because it affords some analytical tractability
for the otherwise intractable general GAN value func-
tion (2). Specifically, if we choose the discriminator
function fω : Rd Ñ R to be a neural network with
L “ 1 hidden layer consisting of H hidden units with
rectifier nonlinearities, and set biases to zero, then the
explicit functional forms of discriminator and genera-
tor are respectively,
fωpxq “
Hÿ
i“1
vixwi, xy1txwi,xyě0u , gθpzq “ V z ,
where ω P twi P Rd, vi P R : @i P rHsu and θ P tV P
Rdˆku are the discriminator and generator parameters,
respectively. If, moreover, we express the covariance
matrix as Σ “ AAT , then the value function can be
expressed in closed form as,
Upθ, ωq “ constˆ
Hÿ
i“1
vi
“}ATwi} ´ }V Twi}‰ . (10)
The above analytical form of the value function sheds
some light on the nature of the local Nash equilibrium
solution concept. In particular, if one solves for the
condition of being a Nash equilibrium, one does not
conclude that V˚V T˚ “ Σ. The result depends on the
rank of the matrix rw1, . . . , wH s.
The evaluation of different optimization algorithms
involved comparing the target density Preal “
Np0,Σq and the analytical generator density Pfake “
Np0, V V T q after t “ 105 training iterations (Fig. 2).
For simplicity, we chose the evaluation metric to be
the Frobenius norm of the difference between the co-
variance matrices }Σ´ V V T }F. The covariance learn-
ing experiments were conducted in the well-specified
and over-parametrized regime (k “ 16, d “ 2) using
H “ 128 hidden units for the discriminator network.
4.2 Mixture of Gaussians
In practical applications, GANs are typically trained
using the empirical distribution of the samples, where
the samples are drawn from an idealized multi-modal
probability distribution. To capture the notion of a
multi-modal data distribution, we focus on a mix-
ture of 8 Gaussians with means located at the ver-
tices of a regular octagon inscribed in the unit cir-
cle, where each component has a fixed diagonal co-
variance of width σ “ 0.03. In contrast to previous
visual-based evaluations, we estimate the Wasserstein-
1 distance W1pPreal,Pfakeq between the target density
Preal and the distribution Pfake of the random vari-
able gθpZq implied by the trained generator network.
The estimate is obtained by solving the linear pro-
gram which computes the earth mover’s distance be-
tween the sample estimates pPreal “ 1m řmi“1 δXi andpPfake “ 1m řmi“1 δgθpZiq, respectively, and approaches
the population version W1pPreal,Pfakeq as the number
of samples mÑ8.
The experiments with the mixture of Gaussians used 2
dimensional Gaussian as input (k “ 2). Both the gen-
erator and discriminator networks consisted of L “ 4
hidden layers with H “ 128 units per hidden layer.
The estimate of the Wasserstein-1 distance was calcu-
lated using a sample size of m “ 512 after training for
t “ 5 ¨ 104 iterations. It is clear from Fig. 3 that the
Wasserstein-1 distance correlates closely with the vi-
sual fit to the target distribution. The empirical eval-
uation (Fig. 2) shows that the separation between con-
sensus optimization and competing algorithms disap-
pears on the mixture distribution, suggesting that the
qualitative ranking is not robust to the choice of loss
landscape. These findings demand deeper understand-
ing of the global structure of the landscape, including
the formulation of regularization to tame the notori-
ously difficult GAN optimization [Arbel et al., 2018],
which is not captured by our local stability analysis.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we made a first step towards under-
standing the local convergence rate of the discrete-
time gradient-based saddle point dynamics for solving
smooth two-player zero-sum games, including GANs
as the leading motivation. The focus of the paper is
on illustrating how local geometry affects the conver-
gence speed and choice of learning-rate for both stable
and unstable local Nash Equilibria. A curious fact we
proved is that modified first-order dynamics such as
OMD converge with linear-rate to unstable local Nash
Equilibria, as a consequence of the interaction term
between the two players.
We acknowledge that there are still critical steps left
open by our analysis in order to understand the ef-
fectiveness of heuristic methods for training GANs for
distribution learning. Solving this problem requires an
understanding of the ability of various stable/unstable
local Nash Equilibria to represent distributions in the
Interaction Matters: A Note on Non-asymptotic Local Convergence of Generative Adversarial Networks
SGA Optimism Consensus
10 4
10 3
10 2
VV
T
2 F
Covariance Learning
SGA Optimism Consensus
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
W
as
se
rs
te
in
 D
ist
an
ce
Mixture of Gaussians
Figure 2: Evaluation metrics for covariance learning
(top) and mixture of Gaussians learning (bottom) us-
ing different dynamical systems after t “ 105 and
t “ 5 ¨ 104 training iterations, respectively and 16 ran-
dom seeds. Note that for covariance learning, we use
the log-scale on y-axis.
statistical sense. To the best of our knowledge, it re-
mains unclear whether convergence to the stable lo-
cal solution concept (Definition 2.1) is better than
converging/oscillating/escaping an unstable local solu-
tion, in terms of distribution learning. Recent progress
by Daskalakis and Panageas [2018b,a] employs the
stable manifold Theorem [Galor, 2007] to show that
certain dynamics avoid unstable local solutions (bar-
ring initialization in a set of Lebesgue measure zero).
Overall, a satisfactory theory — in both the computa-
tional and statistical sense — for answering how heuris-
tic gradient-based saddle point dynamics for GANs are
able to learn distributions is still wide open for future
investigation.
Figure 3: Density plots of best and worst generator
distribution measured by empirical Wasserstein-1 dis-
tance from the target distribution, across all baselines
amongst 16 random seeds (excluding non-convergent
runs) after training for 5 ˆ 104 iterations. Top: Con-
sensus (W1 “ 0.093). Bottom: OMD (W1 “ 0.367).
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A Technical Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Define the line interpolation between two points,
θpxq “ xθt ` p1´ xqθ˚ ,
ωpxq “ xωt ` p1´ xqω˚ .
Then the SGA dynamics can be written as (using Taylor’s theorem with remainder)„
θt`1 ´ θ˚
ωt`1 ´ ω˚

“
„
θt ´ θ˚
ωt ´ ω˚

´ η
„ ∇θUpθt, ωtq
´∇ωUpθt, ωtq

,
“
„
θt ´ θ˚
ωt ´ ω˚

´ η
ż 1
0
„ ∇θθUpθpxq, ωpxqq ∇θωUpθpxq, ωpxqq
´∇ωθUpθpxq, ωpxqq ´∇ωωUpθpxq, ωpxqq

dx ¨
„
θt ´ θ˚
ωt ´ ω˚

,
“
ż 1
0
ˆ
I ´ η
„ ∇θθUpθpxq, ωpxqq ∇θωUpθpxq, ωpxqq
´∇ωθUpθpxq, ωpxqq ´∇ωωUpθpxq, ωpxqq
˙
dx ¨
„
θt ´ θ˚
ωt ´ ω˚

.
Assume that one can prove for some r ą 0, and pθ, ωq P B2ppθ˚, ω˚q, rq, with a proper choice of η, the largest
singular value is bounded above by 1,››››I ´ η „ ∇θθUpθ, ωq ∇θωUpθ, ωq´∇ωθUpθ, ωq ´∇ωωUpθ, ωq
››››
op
ă 1 .
Then due to convexity of the operator norm, the dynamics of SGA is contracting locally because,››››„ θt`1 ´ θ˚ωt`1 ´ ω˚
›››› ď ››››ż 1
0
ˆ
I ´ η
„ ∇θθUpθpxq, ωpxqq ∇θωUpθpxq, ωpxqq
´∇ωθUpθpxq, ωpxqq ´∇ωωUpθpxq, ωpxqq
˙
dx
››››
op
¨
››››„ θt ´ θ˚ωt ´ ω˚
›››› ,
ď
ż 1
0
››››ˆI ´ η „ ∇θθUpθpxq, ωpxqq ∇θωUpθpxq, ωpxqq´∇ωθUpθpxq, ωpxqq ´∇ωωUpθpxq, ωpxqq
˙››››
op
dx ¨
››››„ θt ´ θ˚ωt ´ ω˚
›››› ,
ă
››››„ θt ´ θ˚ωt ´ ω˚
›››› .
Let’s analyze the singular values of
I ´ η
„ ∇θθUpθ, ωq ∇θωUpθ, ωq
´∇ωθUpθ, ωq ´∇ωωUpθ, ωq

,
assuming ∇θθUpθ, ωq ą 0, ´∇ωωUpθ, ωq ą 0. Abbreviate„ ∇θθUpθ, ωq ∇θωUpθ, ωq
´∇ωθUpθ, ωq ´∇ωωUpθ, ωq

:“
„
A C
´CT B

.
The largest singular value of
I ´ η
„
A C
´CT B

,
is the square root of the largest eigenvalue of the following symmetric matrix„
I ´ ηA ´ηC
ηCT I ´ ηB
 „
I ´ ηA ηC
´ηCT I ´ ηB

“
„pI ´ ηAq2 ` η2CCT ´η2pAC ´ CBq
´η2pCTA´BCT q pI ´ ηBq2 ` η2CTC

.
It is clear that when η “ 0, the largest eigenvalue of the above matrix is 1. Observe„pI ´ ηAq2 ` η2CCT ´η2pAC ´ CBq
´η2pCTA´BCT q pI ´ ηBq2 ` η2CTC

“ I ´ 2η
„
A 0
0 B

` η2
„
A2 ` CCT ´AC ` CB
´CTA`BCT B2 ` CTC

,
ă
„
1´ 2ηλmin
ˆ„
A 0
0 B
˙
` η2λmax
ˆ„
A2 ` CCT ´AC ` CB
´CTA`BCT B2 ` CTC
˙
I .
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If we choose η to be
η “
minpθ,ωqPB2ppθ˚,ω˚q,rq λmin
ˆ„
Aθ,ω 0
0 Bθ,ω
˙
maxpθ,ωqPB2ppθ˚,ω˚q,rq λmax
ˆ„
A2θ,ω ` Cθ,ωCTθ,ω ´Aθ,ωCθ,ω ` Cθ,ωBθ,ω
´CTθ,ωAθ,ω `Bθ,ωCTθ,ω B2θ,ω ` CTθ,ωCθ,ω
˙ “ ?α
β
,
then we find
„pI ´ ηAq2 ` η2CCT ´η2pAC ´ CBq
´η2pCTA´BCT q pI ´ ηBq2 ` η2CTC

ă
ˆ
1´ α
β
˙
I .
In this case,››››„ θt`1 ´ θ˚ωt`1 ´ ω˚
›››› ď suppθ,ωqPB2ppθ˚,ω˚q,rq
››››I ´ η „ ∇θθUpθ, ωq ∇θωUpθ, ωq´∇ωθUpθ, ωq ´∇ωωUpθ, ωq
››››
op
››››„ θt ´ θ˚ωt ´ ω˚
›››› ,
ď
c
1´ α
β
¨
››››„ θt ´ θ˚ωt ´ ω˚
›››› .
Therefore, to obtain an -minimizer one requires a number of steps equal to
2
β
α
log
r

.
Proof of Remark 1. Consider Upθq “ 12θTAθ where A ą 0 is strictly positive. Then gradient descent corresponds
to θt`1 “ pI´ηAqθt and thus }θt`1} ď }I´ηA}op}θt}. Setting η “ 1{λmaxpAq we have I´ηA ľ 0 so }I´ηA}op “
λmaxpI ´ ηAq “ 1 ´ λminpAq{λmaxpAq. Therefore }θt} ď }θ0}
“
1 ´ λminpAq{λmaxpAq
‰t ď }θ0}e´tλminpAq{λmaxpAq.
The number of iterations required to obtain an -minimizer is thus bounded as T ě λmaxpAqλminpAq log r .
Proof of Corollary 1. We have „
θt`1
ωt`1

“
„
θt
ωt

´ η
„ ∇θUpθt, ωtq
´∇ωUpθt, ωtq

,
“
ˆ
I ´ η
„
I C
´CT I
˙
¨
„
θt
ωt

.
If we define D “ diag `p1´ ηq2I ` η2CCT , p1´ ηq2I ` η2CTC˘ then using the Rayleigh quotient representation
of λminpDq we obtain, ››››„θt`1ωt`1
››››2 “ “θt ωt‰D „θtωt

ě λminpDq
››››„θtωt
››››2 .
On the other hand,
λminpDq “ λmin
`p1´ ηq2I ` η2CCT ˘ “ 1´ 2η ` “1` λminpCCT q‰η2 ě λminpCCT q
1` λminpCCT q
regardless of the choice of η, which proves the claim.
Proof of Theorem 3. Recall that the OMD dynamics iteratively updates„
θt`1
ωt`1

“
ˆ
I ´ 2η
„
0 C
´CT 0
˙
¨
„
θt
ωt

` η
„
0 C
´CT 0

¨
„
θt´1
ωt´1

.
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Define the following matrices
R1 “
ˆ
I ´ 2η
„
0 C
´CT 0
˙
`
ˆ
I ´ 4η2
„
CCT 0
0 CTC
˙1{2
2
, (11)
R2 “
ˆ
I ´ 2η
„
0 C
´CT 0
˙
´
ˆ
I ´ 4η2
„
CCT 0
0 CTC
˙1{2
2
. (12)
It is easy to verify that
R1 `R2 “
ˆ
I ´ 2η
„
0 C
´CT 0
˙
,
R1R2 “ R2R1 “
ˆ
I ´ 2η
„
0 C
´CT 0
˙2
´
ˆ
I ´ 4η2
„
CCT 0
0 CTC
˙
4
“ ´η
„
0 C
´CT 0

.
The commutative property R1R2 “ R2R1 follows from a singular value decomposition argument: Letting C “
UDV T be the SVD of C (D diagonal) one finds,
C
`
I ´ 4η2CTC˘1{2 “ UD `I ´ 4η2D2˘1{2 V T “ U `I ´ 4η2D2˘1{2DV T “ `I ´ 4η2CCT ˘1{2 C .
Using the above equality, the commutative property followsˆ
I ´ 2η
„
0 C
´CT 0
˙ˆ
I ´ 4η2
„
CCT 0
0 CTC
˙1{2
“
ˆ
I ´ 4η2
„
CCT 0
0 CTC
˙1{2ˆ
I ´ 2η
„
0 C
´CT 0
˙
,
ùñ R1R2 “ R2R1 .
Now we have the following relations for OMD,„
θt`1
ωt`1

´R1
„
θt
ωt

“ R2
ˆ„
θt
ωt

´R1
„
θt´1
ωt´1
˙
,„
θt`1
ωt`1

´R2
„
θt
ωt

“ R1
ˆ„
θt
ωt

´R2
„
θt´1
ωt´1
˙
.
Hence
pR1 ´R2q
„
θt
ωt

“ Rt1
ˆ„
θ1
ω1

´R2
„
θ0
ω0
˙
´Rt2
ˆ„
θ1
ω1

´R1
„
θ0
ω0
˙
. (13)
Let’s analyze the singular values of R1 and R2. We have,
R1 “
ˆ
I ´ 2η
„
0 C
´CT 0
˙
`
ˆ
I ´ 4η2
„
CCT 0
0 CTC
˙1{2
2
,
“
«
I`pI´4η2CCT q1{2
2 ´ηC
ηCT I`pI´4η
2CTCq1{2
2
ff
,
R1R
T
1 “
«
I`pI´4η2CCT q1{2
2 ´ηC
ηCT I`pI´4η
2CTCq1{2
2
ff«
I`pI´4η2CCT q1{2
2 ηC
´ηCT I`pI´4η2CTCq1{22
ff
,
“
»—–
´
I`pI´4η2CCT q1{2
2
¯2 ` η2CCT 0
0
´
I`pI´4η2CTCq1{2
2
¯2 ` η2CTC
fiffifl ,
“
«
I`pI´4η2CCT q1{2
2 0
0 I`pI´4η
2CTCq1{2
2
ff
.
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Similarly
R2R
T
2 “
«
I´pI´4η2CCT q1{2
2 0
0 I´pI´4η
2CTCq1{2
2
ff
.
For η small enough, the spectral radius satisfies the strict inequality }R1}op ă 1. Concretely, for example,
η “ 1
2
a
2λmaxpCCT q
ùñ
I ` pI ´ 4η2CCT q1{2
2
ĺ
I ` pI ´ 2η2CCT q
2
“ I ´ η2CCT ĺ
„
1´ 1
8
λminpCCT q
λmaxpCCT q

I ,
I ´ pI ´ 4η2CCT q1{2
2
ĺ
1
2
I .
Therefore }R1}op ď
b
1´ 18 λminpCC
T q
λmaxpCCT q , }R2}op ď
b
1´ 12 .
The RHS of Eqn. (13) is upper bounded because››››Rt2ˆ„θ1ω1

´R1
„
θ0
ω0
˙›››› ď ˆ1´ 12
˙t{2
p}pθ1, ω1q} ` }pθ0, ω0q}q ,››››Rt1ˆ„θ1ω1

´R2
„
θ0
ω0
˙›››› ď ˆ1´ 18 λminpCCT qλmaxpCCT q
˙t{2
p}pθ1, ω1q} ` }pθ0, ω0q}q .
Moreover the LHS satisfies ››››pR1 ´R2q „θtωt
›››› ě ››››„θtωt
››››
c
1
2
.
Combining these inequalities we obtain
}pθt, ωtq}
c
1
2
ď
«ˆ
1´ 1
2
˙t{2
`
ˆ
1´ 1
8
λminpCCT q
λmaxpCCT q
˙t{2ff
p}pθ0, ω0q} ` }pθ1, ω1q}q . (14)
By our assumption }pθ0, ω0q}, }pθ1, ω1q} ď r so
}pθt, ωtq} ď 2
?
2r
«ˆ
1´ 1
2
˙t{2
`
ˆ
1´ 1
8
λminpCCT q
λmaxpCCT q
˙t{2ff
, (15)
ď 2?2r
„
exp
ˆ
´ t
4
˙
` exp
ˆ
´ t
16
λminpCCT q
λmaxpCCT q
˙
, (16)
because @px, αq P Rˆ R` : p1´ xqα ď e´αx. Thus
}pθt, ωtq} ď 2
?
2r exp
ˆ
´ t
16
λminpCCT q
λmaxpCCT q
˙„
1` exp
ˆ
´ t
4
` t
16
λminpCCT q
λmaxpCCT q
˙
. (17)
But 16 ě 4 λminpCCT q
λmaxpCCT q ùñ ´ 14 ` 116 λminpCC
T q
λmaxpCCT q ď 0 so
}pθt, ωtq} ď 2
?
2r exp
ˆ
´ t
16
λminpCCT q
λmaxpCCT q
˙
r1` 1s , (18)
“ 4?2r exp
ˆ
´ t
16
λminpCCT q
λmaxpCCT q
˙
. (19)
To sum up, when
T ě
R
16
λmaxpCCT q
λminpCCT q log
4
?
2r

V
,
one can ensure }pθT , ωT q} ď .
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Proof of Theorem 6. In this case, the consensus optimization satisfies the following update„
θt`1
ωt`1

“
ˆ
I ´ η
„
γCCT C
´CT γCTC
˙
¨
„
θt
ωt

. (20)
Again let’s analyze the singular values of the operator K :“
ˆ
I ´ η
„
γCCT C
´CT γCTC
˙
, or equivalently, the
eigenvalues of KKT ,
KKT “
„
I ´ ηγCCT ´ηC
ηCT I ´ ηγCTC
 „
I ´ ηγCCT ηC
´ηCT I ´ ηγCTC

,
“
„ pI ´ ηγCCT q2 ` η2CCT pI ´ ηγCCT qηC ´ ηCpI ´ ηγCTCq
ηCT pI ´ ηγCCT q ´ pI ´ ηγCTCqηCT pI ´ ηγCTCq2 ` η2CTC

,
“
„pI ´ ηγCCT q2 ` η2CCT 0
0 pI ´ ηγCTCq2 ` η2CTC

.
Now consider the largest eigenvalue of pI ´ ηγCCT q2 ` η2CCT , for a fixed γ, with a properly chosen η. Using
the SVD C “ UDV T , we obtain
pI ´ ηγCCT q2 ` η2CCT “ U “pI ´ ηγD2q2 ` η2D2‰UT
ĺ
“
1´ 2γλminpCCT qη ` pγ2λ2maxpCCT q ` λmaxpCCT qη2
‰
I ,
“
„
1´ γ
2λ2minpCCT q
γ2λ2maxpCCT q ` λmaxpCCT q

I ,
with
η “ γλminpCC
T q
λmaxpCCT q ` γ2λ2maxpCCT q .
Proof of Theorem 5. In this case, the implicit update satisfies the update rule„
θt`1
ωt`1

“
„
θt
ωt

´ η
„
0 C
´CT 0

¨
„
θt`1
ωt`1

(21)ˆ
I ` η
„
0 C
´CT 0
˙
¨
„
θt`1
ωt`1

“
„
θt
ωt

. (22)
Let’s analyze the singular values of the matrix K :“
ˆ
I ` η
„
0 C
´CT 0
˙
, or equivalently the root of eigenvalues
of KKT
KKT “
„
I ηC
´ηCT I
 „
I ´ηC
ηCT I

“
„
I ` η2CCT 0
0 I ` η2CTC

.
It is clear that the singular values of K, denoted by σipKq is sandwiched betweenb
1` η2λminpCCT q ď σipKq ď
b
1` η2λmaxpCCT q .
If we choose η “ 1?
λmaxpCCT q , then
0 ď η2λminpCCT q ď λminpCC
T q
λmaxpCCT q ď 1 .
Using the fact that for all 0 ď t ď 1, 1` p?2´ 1qt ď ?1` t, then
σminpKq ě
b
1` η2λminpCCT q ě 1` p
?
2´ 1q λminpCC
T q
λmaxpCCT q .
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Recall Eqn. (22), using the fact for all 0 ď t ď 1, 1{p1` p?2´ 1qtq ď 1´ p1´ 1{?2qt, we know
σminpKq ¨
››››„θt`1ωt`1
›››› ď ››››„θtωt
››››››››„θt`1ωt`1
›››› ď 1
1` p?2´ 1q λminpCCT q
λmaxpCCT q
››››„θtωt
››››
ď
ˆ
1´ p1´ 1?
2
q λminpCC
T q
λmaxpCCT q
˙››››„θtωt
›››› .
To sum up, when
T ě
R
p2`?2qλmaxpCC
T q
λminpCCT q log
r

V
,
one can ensure }pθT , ωT q} ď .
Proof of Theorem 4. In the simple bi-linear game case,„
θt`1
ωt`1

“
„
θt
ωt

´
„
0 ηC
´ηCT 0
 „
θt`1{2
ωt`1{2

,
“
„
θt
ωt

´
„
0 ηC
´ηCT 0
 „
I ´γC
γCT I
 „
θt
ωt

,
“
„
I ´ ηγCCT ´ηC
ηCT I ´ ηγCTC
 „
θt
ωt

.
Note this linear system is the same as that in Thm. 6. Therefore the convergence analysis follows in the same
way as Thm. 6.
